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A B S T R A C T
We integrate the institutional perspective with research on the governance role of private equity
firms in an investigation of Founder-CEO successions in Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) in emer-
ging markets. Using a unique, hand-collected and comprehensive sample of 191 firms having
undertaken IPOs in 21 markets across the African continent between January 2000 and August
2016, we apply instrumental variable (IV) Probit methodology and find that higher levels of
private equity ownership are positively associated with the probability of the founder's retention
as CEO, especially in the context of low-quality formal institutions. Further, in societies with high
tribalism, higher private equity ownership is associated with an increased likelihood of founder
retention. Voids in the institutional architecture underscore the importance of the founder as a
key organizational resource for the firm and a source of institutionalized legitimacy, which in
turn confers on the firm an ability to access required resources.
Executive summary
Prior literature has accorded founder succession from the CEO leadership role within entrepreneurial firms as a key milestone in
their life-cycles (e.g. Jain and Tabak, 2008). This has built on a voluminous literature on generic CEO succession occurring in more
developed, later stage firms. However, this research has typically adopted an agency-theoretic or resource dependence frameworks
that view institutions as a thin veil reinforcing external contracting. A more recent institutional approach has been advanced (e.g.
Peng et al., 2008, 2018), which emphasizes the central importance of institutions in shaping the strategic orientation of firms, and the
appropriate governance for achieving these socialized performance goals.
We focus on the interaction between private equity, both venture capitalists (VCs) and business angels (BAs), and entrepreneurial
founder succession from CEO role at the initial public offering (IPO) juncture in the context of emerging markets. Private equity is
representative of critical resource and capital infusions into early-stage firms, and typically those involved possess intimate
knowledge of the venture's true worth in uncertain environments of emerging markets. Hence, their decision making at the IPO
juncture takes into account the continuing value of the founder being retained in the leadership role. We argue that the value of the
founder is also contingent on the institutional environment within which the firm is embedded. Our empirical evidence suggests that
higher private equity ownership pre-IPO is associated with founder retention as CEO at IPO. This association is negatively moderated
by formal institutional quality, implying higher institutional quality influences succession, and positively moderated by informal
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tribalism, implying tribal relations influence retention.
Our paper makes several contributions. The first is that private equity recognizes the extended value of the founder well beyond
the junctures at which succession would normally take place, such as at IPO. This is owing to the founder's enhanced social capital,
derived through informal institutions in emerging economies, typically supporting relational contracting, as opposed to the arm's
length external contracting prevalent in Western societies. The second is that higher formal institutional quality is supportive of
external contracting, leading to emphasis on external contract procurement of resources and hence a reduced necessity for founder
value, while the opposite is true in low-quality jurisdictions, characterized by institutional “voids”. The third is that elevated tribalism
within society emphasizes culture-based relational contracting, the accentuation of founder value in terms of social capital, and thus
their retention. The opposite is true in contexts of lower tribalism. We utilize the Worldwide Governance metrics (Kaufman et al.,
2009) to account for changes in formal institutional quality, while we apply a unique and recently developed tribal index from the
University of South Florida to account for tribalism.
1. Introduction
Our study focuses on how formal and informal institutions may shape the impact of private equity entities – with these including
Business Angels (BA) and Venture Capitalists (VC) – on the likelihood of retaining the entrepreneurial founder as CEO. Prior studies in
the strategic management and entrepreneurship fields have identified several opportunities for private equity entities to initiate
founder succession from CEO role during the early stages of the firm's life-cycle (Chahine et al., 2011; Wassermann, 2003). These
include periods after initial product launches as well as the Initial Public Offering (IPO) event itself, which is a particularly prominent
milestone given the transition from early stage entrepreneurial-founder led governance to that of a professional management
structure (Brav and Gompers, 2003). This research is underpinned by arguments that founders may represent an important orga-
nizational resource at early stages of venture development. However, as the new venture develops, founders may have limited
capabilities to drive the venture's further growth: they may lack incentives and strategic expertise, or management may suffer from
founder hubris and unjustified self-confidence. The vast majority of studies have been focused on the founder succession at IPOs in
the US/UK context (Jain and Tabak, 2008), with a paucity of studies that take into account the institutional perspective with its
emphasis on the diversity of formal and informal institutional environments outside developed market economies. More specifically,
there is a dearth of studies exploring how different constellations of formal and informal institutions may impact the value of original
founders as an important organizational resource at the “threshold” juncture of IPOs.
In developed economies, resources and expertise necessary for the venture's further growth may be acquired in relatively de-
veloped factor markets, and as the venture develops and grows, its VC investors may rely less on the founder as a critical resource and
more on institutionalized markets for resources, including managerial knowledge and expertise. Private equity investors are well
connected to the markets for organizational resources, including that for human capital, and their involvement makes a CEO-founder
succession more likely. For example, Jain and Tabak (2008) undertook a comprehensive study of founder succession at IPO in the US
and found that the presence of private equity is more likely to precipitate a succession event and transition of leadership. However,
this analysis is limited in scope in terms of formal and informal institutional contexts.
Contrastingly, a dominant feature of the institutional environment in many emerging economies is the propensity for extended
relational contracting. This is embodied in the extensive clan and tribal systems prevalent in these nascent economies, and forms the
basis of an institutional framework shaped on these deeper and more pervasive sociological features of indigenous societies (Khavul
et al., 2009). Such tribal interests typically co-opt nascent external factor and managerial-labour markets, with these resources then
being accessible through extended relational contracting, based on reciprocity derived from social status within tribal governance
systems. Consequently, the combination of the founder's social status and their adeptness in handling tribal cultural systems un-
derscores the significance of their human and social capital in representing the only resources available for successful venture
development (Bruton et al., 2013). For example, with a limited pool of well-educated and experienced professional managers, it may
prove difficult for the venture's investors to find a replacement for its founder as CEO. In this context, the legacy of an original
founder, or “founder imprint” (Stinchcombe, 1965:169), becomes particularly important, and this should be recognized by the
venture's early-stage investors.
We extend these preliminary insights by bringing an institutional perspective to the very heart of the founder-succession research,
and considering a range of formal institutional qualities as well as variation in the informal institutional context in the form of
tribalism within society. Tribalism is notably associated with powerful sociological constructs within society, based on extended
social relations and reciprocity reflected in clans, ethnic lineages or extended familial arrangements (Khavul et al., 2009).
Using a unique, hand-collected and comprehensive sample of 191 firms having undertaken IPOs in 21 markets across the African
continent between January 2000 and August 2016, we develop our hypotheses and empirical analysis. We integrate arguments
grounded in agency- and resource-based views with the institutional perspective, in the context of founder-succession at IPO in
emerging markets. Africa forms a unique laboratory within which to undertake our study, owing to its considerable intra-regional
variance in formal institutional quality due to the colonial past, while indigenous societies are predominantly characterized by a
juxtaposition of informal institutional tribalism alongside incongruous superimposed formal institutions that have largely been in-
fluenced by the aforementioned legacy of the colonial past. This underscores the importance of founders as an organizational re-
source in terms of the impact arising from formal institutional “voids” (Khanna and Rivkin, 2001; Khanna and Palepu, 2000), as well
as their ability to fit in with the extended relational contracting typical in tribal societies.
We apply instrumental variable (IV) Probit methodology, which takes endogeneity into account, and find that higher levels of
private equity ownership are positively associated with the probability of the founder's retention as CEO, especially in countries with
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low institutional quality. Here, the voids or deficiencies in the institutional architecture underscore the importance of the founder as a
key organizational resource for the firm and a source of institutionalized legitimacy, which confers on the firm an ability to access
required resources. This importance seems to be well-recognized by the firm's pre-IPO investors. In high-institutional quality con-
texts, there is support for extensive third-party contracting and the acquisition of resources using external markets. Here, higher
private equity ownership is associated with founder succession. Conversely, in societies with high tribalism, higher private equity
ownership is associated with an increased likelihood of founder retention, while the opposite is true in low-tribalism contexts. Our
theorizing and empirical analyses indicate that formal and informal institutions are important contingency factors that have opposing
effects on key inter-relationships between private equity involvement and founder retention in emerging market IPOs.
Our study contributes to the IPO governance research literature in a number of ways. First, our theoretical approach emphasizes
the use of institutionalist perspectives as opposed to a universalistic agency-theoretic approach, such as Jain and Tabak (2008) where
the institutional context is viewed merely as a thin veil supporting the external contracting environment and associated theorizing. In
this way, a relatively static agency view of insiders, and founders in particular, being associated with downside risks by external
principals is surpassed by consideration of contextually embedded governance arrangements and the founder's role in accessing and
securing resources. Second, our study contributes to the executive succession literature, where our findings underscore the im-
portance of formal and informal institutional contexts in providing the conditions behind the integration of rival resource-depen-
dence and agency-theory-grounded explanations of a firm's dependence on its founder's networks. Third, our study contributes to
institutional theory by considering opposing simultaneous effects of the juxtaposition of formal and informal institutions in the
context of founder-CEO succession. We show that the effects of private equity on this important aspect of corporate governance
development in companies in emerging markets are far from being universal. The quality of formal institutions and the extent of
informal tribal relationships in a particular country are among the key factors that define the overall value-added of critical gov-
ernance changes at the IPO juncture of the firm's lifecycle, which provides a more contextualized theoretical analysis of the dynamics
of corporate governance at key organizational thresholds.
2. Theory and hypotheses
Entrepreneurial founders are pivotal at an early stage of development of the firm, in the recognition and exploitation of economic
opportunities. Support for entrepreneurs at this embryonic stage of development comes in the form of private equity (Brav and
Gompers, 2003). Private equity investors initiate resource infusions, taking the form of financial as well as human and social capital,
in order to effectively incubate the early-stage investee firm (Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002). Such early-stage involvement comes in
two forms: BAs and VCs. The former are notable in being informal and thus associated with greater interpersonal emphasis between
the founder and the angel investor (Freear et al., 1995), which is argued to make this form of financing more resilient to pressures
than the more formalized VCs (Bruton et al., 2010; Bammens and Collewaert, 2014). VCs' formality arises from their being formalized
organizations in their own right, and having their own distinct investors. These typically come in the form of general partners in a VC
fund, a commercial bank in the case of bank-administered VC financing, or regional state agencies in the case of state- and devel-
opment-agency administered VC financing (Bruton et al., 2010). Both BAs and VCs are comparable in being early-stage investors and
in being equally subject to powerful institutionalized norms centred on the globally dominant VC industry centred in the US and
underpinned by an assumption of “investor supremacy” (Bruton et al., 2005).
Prior studies of the governance roles of private equity investors in firms at the IPO stage of their development emphasize the
importance of formal, market-orientated risk management, transparency in reporting, as well as a variety of mechanisms designed to
mitigate moral hazard – such as performance-based covenants (Bruton et al., 2010; Chahine et al., 2012). An implicit assumption
transcending all of these is that the prevailing institutional framework is supportive of extensive third-party contracting and external
market intermediation (Peng et al., 2008). Thus, Wasserman (2003) argues that, at junctures following new product launches, rounds
of financing by private equity entities, or stock exchange listing, private equity investors are likely to initiate organizational trans-
formation by triggering founder succession. Such founder succession results in a “routinization of charisma” (Weber, 1978:246),
wherein the charisma of individuals is depersonalized into rules and routines associated with distinct roles within an emergent
corporate bureaucracy. This adoption of a formal governance structure marks the transition from what is wholly dependent on
founder charisma to a model incorporating professional management. Thus, at a certain juncture, the potential benefits associated
with founder resource provision are offset by the contrasting benefits of resources procured from external intermediaries – where
these are essential to maintain the venture's continued growth and development.
A contrasting picture is apparent in emerging economies, which are typically characterized by formal institutional voids or
weaknesses (Peng et al., 2018) – institutional voids being defined as imperfections in financial, product, and labour markets (Khanna
and Yafeh, 2007) – and by the presence of deeper informal sociological constructs such as tribal or ethnic lineage affiliations that
permeate their societies (Hearn et al., 2018). While both the formal and informal dimensions are associated with deficiencies in
external contracting, they do this in quite different ways. The former, namely formal institutional voids, are theoretically associated
with greater importance being attached to the personal charisma of the founder, where their personal involvement in the venture is
based on their personal charisma that effectively shapes the degree of altruism among immediate kin who are often also involved in
the firm. In this way, the founder shapes the nascent managerial culture in the upper echelon of the firm, while the wider firm
benefits from the considerable exchange legitimacy and influence legitimacy conveyed by the founder (Suchman, 1995). Thus, the
founder's presence confers legitimacy and hence a powerful degree of acceptability and compatibility on the new venture. In this way,
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the founder's personal charisma can act as a critical determinant of the success of early-stage marketing associated with new product
launches – which is a form of the exchange legitimation – as well as reflecting dispositional or character-based congruity of the wider
venture with cultural-societal norms. This acts to build trust in (e.g. Granovetter, 1985) and moral acceptability of the new venture
among wider audiences and constituencies (Wassermann, 2003).
The latter, namely tribal or ethnic-lineage sociological constructs, typically originate from patriarchal, or occasionally ma-
triarchical, notions of extended family and clans, often spanning multiple generations, and form the basis for the national culture and
culturally based extended relational contracting (Bhappu, 2000). This is typically more complex and far-reaching than in Western
societal contexts; in tribal-, clan- or ethnic-lineage-dominated societies, relational contracting is based on social dimensions relating
to vertical subordination to authority and horizontally extended reciprocity (Bhappu, 2000). Societies based on such deeper ethnic-
lineage-, tribal- and clan-based sociological structures are distinctive in being network economies. Capital, labour and product
markets are relational (as opposed to transactional) in nature (Hoskisson et al., 2004), with these markets being fundamentally closed
and “internal” within the extended social networks permeating the economy (Fogel, 2006). Following the institutional-based per-
spective of Peng et al. (2008) and Peng et al. (2018), we argue that these distinctive, culturally based, relational-contracting me-
chanisms underpinning tribalism form a sub-stratum of broader informal institutions that shape the strategy and governance of firms.
These distinctive sociological characteristics form the basis of both Wasta in Arabian-influenced societies – such as those across
North and East Africa – (Berger et al., 2015; Sidani and Thornberry, 2013) and Ubuntu in traditional African-orientated societies
(West, 2014). An individual's personal social standing has a far wider-reaching definition than in Western societies and encompasses
that of both their extended family and wider clan. Thus, an individual's personal Wasta or Ubuntu is defined as an accumulation of
personal, family and clan credibility and their historical behaviour.
Wasta1 is very similar to Guan'xi in Chinese Confucianist societies in East Asia, a term which captures the dynamics of social
capital and status within networks in society (Bourdieu, 1985; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998) and which is a distinctive trait of
societies based on collectivism and communitarianism (West, 2014). Business is undertaken through extended, highly socialized
interactions, involving benevolence towards members of one's own tribal, clan and familial network, while adverse selection and
moral hazard are mitigated by reputation-based credibility of both oneself and one's affiliated group (Coleman, 1988). However such
extended social networks rooted in reciprocity and mutual co-ownership of assets are also apparent across Sub-Saharan Africa (see
Khavul et al., 2009), where it is argued that “…African society is a system of mutually benefiting reciprocities” (Otite, 1978, quoted in
Darley and Blankson, 2008:377). This is embodied in indigenous African Ubuntu, which is comparable to Wasta and similarly based
on collectivism and communitarianism (West, 2014).
In emerging markets, a founder's specific value is derived either from their ability to successfully manipulate such powerful
culturally based constructs that lie behind relational contracting, or from their own personal, elevated Wasta or Ubuntu social
standing (Berger et al., 2015). Thus, a founder's very identity within indigenous society is a critical resource in a wider web of
extended social networks based on reciprocity (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). These networks provide the basis of both the iden-
tification of entrepreneurial opportunities and the access to resources to exploit those opportunities (Khanna and Rivkin, 2001;
Khanna and Palepu, 2000). These arguments are in line with organizational imprint research that suggests that the firm's strategic
choices may be affected by its historic evolution, in terms of building knowledge-related, intangible resources, as well as changing
financial constraints (Hannan, 1998; Helfat, 1997; Stinchcombe, 1965). Filatotchev and Piesse (2009), in their study of global IPOs,
argue that a combination of these factors creates IPO imprinting conditions, and they provide empirical evidence that post-flotation
strategies of newly listed firms are path-dependent, with past investment in intangible assets such as patents, licenses, specific
expertise, etc., having an impact on post-IPO development strategies. As we indicated above, in emerging markets, founders' social
and human capital represent a core intangible resource, making founder retention more value-creating, in line with prior work on
imprinting (e.g., Stinchcombe 1965:169).
These arguments combined have a twofold impact on the relationship between private equity ownership and founder's retention
as CEO in founder-led firms at IPO. Firstly, from the resource-based view, holding significant ownership stakes provides private
equity investors with the opportunity to appropriate value-added associated with the founder, the founder being a key organizational
resource. Secondly, from an agency perspective, private equity investors may require a higher degree of control, associated with
elevated cash flow rights, to constrain the downside risks related to founder retention (Fama and Jensen, 1983). In emerging markets,
this includes potential risks associated with the founder's implicit involvement within extended, socially defined, reciprocal networks
underpinned by culture-based relational contracting. Theoretically, this emphasizes the importance of relational contracting – both to
mitigate the adverse selection problem in selecting investment targets, and to decrease moral hazard costs. Furthermore, this un-
derscores the fundamental importance of socialized networks and relational contracting, in terms of the acquisition of resources for
the early-stage entrepreneurial firm in an emerging economy (Bourdieu, 1985; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). The founder is of
paramount importance to the venture, while the private equity, themselves subject to the institutionalized need for legitimacy within
the indigenous context (Suchman, 1995), also recognize the importance of social contracting. In this way, private equity – and
particularly VC managers – with a significant ownership stake in the entrepreneurial firm will place greater emphasis on conformity
1 Berger et al. (2015) define Wasta in terms of three relational constructs. Firstly, there is Mojamala - defined as socio-emotional feelings of
participants in a transactional relationship, corresponding to stimulating feelings of well-being and enduring friendship. Secondly, Hamola cor-
responds to human empathy, benevolence and favouritism, which in a tribal, clan or familial context is often confused with the Western concept of
nepotism. Thirdly, Somah is the cognitive component of Wasta, centred on the mutual credence in a relationship. This is in turn based on mutual
past history, tribe reputation and an individual's personal reputation and past actions.
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with the dominant prevailing institutional logics shaping indigenous society, as opposed to the US-centred norms dominating the
investment notions prevalent in the global industry (see Bruton et al., 2005). Given these arguments, we propose the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. In emerging markets, private equity ownership is positively associated with the founder as CEO at IPO.
2.1. Quality of formal institutions
We argue that the quality of formal institutions is a natural candidate to moderate our hypothesized association between private
equity ownership and founder retention as CEO at IPO. Low-institutional-quality contexts are representative of voids or deficiencies
that inhibit effective intermediation of external resource markets (Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002; Fogel, 2006). These resources include
factors of production, managerial labour and capital (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007). From the agency perspective, such voids exacerbate
asymmetric information by decreasing transparency, and reduce the effectiveness of enforcement mechanisms designed to support
third-party contracting and the protection of property rights inherent within it (Khanna and Palepu, 2000). In this case, private equity
requires higher levels of control to constrain the downside risks of founder opportunism, in the light of weaker external formal
institutional mechanisms by which they might otherwise protect their property rights, and to mitigate these agency and contracting
costs (Khanna and Rivkin, 2001).
Further, in terms of providing a new venture with necessary resources, there is a much greater emphasis on social networks and
relational contracting (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998), including the role of founder networks, in terms of acquiring resources vital to
the success of the firm (Hoskisson et al., 2004), which is recognized by private equity entities. Again, in a less developed institutional
environment, access to these founder-related resources becomes particularly important in terms of the venture's value creation and
growth.
Conversely, in more developed regulatory institutional environments, the VCs need less controlling power to reduce the downside
effects of founder-CEO opportunism (Bruton et al., 2010). Enhanced legal and judicial mechanisms, as well as transparency, protect
against infringements of the property rights of contracting parties. Private equity investors also have less value associated with
founders, as the latter can be replaced in more developed managerial labour markets (Moore et al., 2012). Private equity investors
recognize this improvement in institutional and contracting environments in terms of a transition in the firm's organization towards a
more professionalized and formal management structure that can better cope with the demands of external resource markets (Bruton
et al., 2010). These markets are governed by labour associations, such as unions and capital market associations, that ensure con-
formity with listings and regulatory rules, as well as investor requirements for transparency and reporting, and professional product
market associations (Jain and Tabak, 2008). These aspects lead the firm towards calling on very different skill sets from the early-
stage entrepreneurial founders, providing the motivation for a transition in leadership. In this way, formal institutional quality is a
powerful contingency factor that moderates our base association between private equity ownership and founder retention in
emerging market IPOs, identified in Hypothesis 1. These theoretical arguments are outlined in Fig. 1. Based on them, we suggest the
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. In emerging economies, formal institutional quality will negatively moderate the relationship between private equity














Fig. 1. Theoretical associations.
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2.2. Informal institutions and tribalism
Extending our institutional perspective outlined above to informal institutional settings, we further argue that tribalism is another
important contingency factor that moderates the association between private equity ownership and founder retention. More speci-
fically, tribalism mitigates the existing institutional “voids” view of deficiencies in the external contracting environment in emerging
markets (Khanna and Rivkin, 2001; Khanna and Palepu, 2000), capturing the extended relational dynamics that govern all social and
economic transactions within such societies.
As argued above, founders provide access to otherwise inaccessible resources – obtained through their accumulated Wasta or
Ubuntu social status in personal networks (Berger et al., 2015; Sidani and Thornberry, 2013) – while also being able to use this status
to instigate some measure of institutional decoupling from the collectivist notion of mutual co-ownership of economic assets. In this
way, extended multi-generational definitions of family or clan act as a cohesive social welfare system, providing mutual economic
assurance to all members, through powerful notions of altruism linked to an individual's personal identity. Such mutuality is a
potential issue when extended clan and familial members are able to exercise their mutual co-ownership claims (Khavul et al., 2009),
while the legitimacy of the founder acts to inhibit this behaviour if they retain control over the entrepreneurial venture. Thus, when
tribal institutions dominate, the probability of founders pursuing non-financial and socially constructed objectives is higher, as is the
likelihood of their being subjected to financial support claims from extended family and clan members. Therefore, private equity
needs higher monitoring power through elevated ownership to mitigate the founder opportunism that may be particularly likely and
severe in this institutional context.
From the resource-based view, the importance of the founder within network economies is paramount – in accessing resources
through personal Wasta or Ubuntu – while at same time dis-embedding economic assets of firm from being dispersed across wider
clan or extended family. Founders' personal charisma on the one hand acts to dis-embed the organization from competing mutual co-
ownership claims over resources. On the other hand, it provides the venture with considerable personal and firm-wide character or
dispositional legitimacy, arising from the inextricable ties between the founder's personal identity and that of the firm. The accen-
tuated importance of the founders in socialized network economies such as those within tribal societies is not lost on private equity
entities who themselves are either drawn from the same cultural background, such as BA investors, or must necessarily fit in with it in
order to do business, such as VCs (Peng et al., 2008, 2018). Therefore, the founder's value to the venture is much higher in the context
of high tribalism, implying more opportunities for the appropriation of value by private equity when external investors hold a
significant ownership stake in the venture.
Conversely, in societies with low tribalism, there is less institutionalized necessity for relational contracting, given the inherent
differences in the institutional framework, which supports third-party, “arm's length” contracting (e.g. Peng et al., 2018). As such,
intermediation is undertaken externally in fundamentally open markets for resource procurement, as opposed to essentially closed,
internally undertaken, intermediation based on relational contracting as happens in tribal societies. This is reflected in private equity
being more subject to institutional norms based on the globally dominant US industry (Bruton et al., 2005) and less subject to
potentially counter-balancing needs to attain legitimacy from incongruous indigenous cognitive institutions based on tribalism.
Further, weaker tribal connections of the founder make it less likely that s/he will pursue socially embedded, non-economic ob-
jectives (Coleman, 1988). Therefore, private equity investors are more likely to seek founder succession in societies with less tri-
balism, in order to initiate a transition to a professionalized management structure so as to take advantage of externally procured
resources.
Theoretically, we therefore anticipate a positive moderation effect of tribalism on the association between founder retention and
private equity ownership, and we propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3. In emerging economies, the extent of informal tribal relationships will positively moderate the relationship between
private equity ownership and founder's retention as CEO at IPO.
To summarise our theoretical arguments, we propose a contingency model with a base effect and two contingency (moderating)
effects, as outlined in Fig. 1.
3. Data and methodology
3.1. Sample
To study the interplay between formal and informal institutions, we focused on IPOs in African countries, a region characterized
by a complex patchwork of formal institutions established by various colonial rulers in the past, as well as a diverse pattern of more
long-term, historic tribal links and associations. A further observation can be made regarding institutional quality, tribalism and legal
origin. While African countries' legal systems can easily be classified as either common law or civil code law, this dichotomous
classification is better suited to reflecting the structure of the economic system, rather than to making inferences on institutional
quality as is undertaken by La Porta et al. (1997, 1998). It is evident that some common-law countries, such as Nigeria and Zambia,
have equally poor institutional quality as civil-code-law counterparts such as BRVM (Cote d'Ivoire), Mozambique, Egypt and Algeria.
Countries adhering to common law yield greater institutional support for external markets, and at least provide a basis for arm's
length contracting, while their civil-code-law counterparts are rooted in the “Dirigiste” or state-led capitalist model (Hearn, 2015).
Here, the state either directly or indirectly exerts control over factor markets.
There is considerable variation within the generic classifications of civil-code and common-law jurisdictions. This is exemplified
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on the one hand by Algeria and three cantonments (provinces) of Sénégal that were administered by colonial authorities as an
integral part of metropolitan France, while on other hand national frameworks such as that of Egypt were established through
Napoleonic conquest but then subject to substantive reform by English common law through incorporation into the British empire
(Hearn, 2015). South Africa and, by virtue of colonization, its neighbour Namibia both adhere to Roman-Dutch civil code law –
transplanted to Southern Africa prior to the Napoleonic conquest of the Netherlands.2 However, all transplanted European-origin
formal institutional frameworks have been subject to varying degrees of assimilation into the indigenous societal matrix, often
leading to their incorporation within tribal systems. Regulatory “capture” of formal transplanted frameworks, by elites drawn from a
handful of ethnicities or clans (Hearn et al., 2017), has degraded the impartiality of such institutions (Hearn, 2015), and generated
disenfranchised populaces within underlying, essentially feudal, systems. This emphasizes the importance of founder networks in
obtaining resources for entrepreneurial ventures.
The dataset was constructed in three stages. First, a list of IPOs between January 2000 and August 2016 in African markets was
identified. The markets include Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, the Cape Verde Islands (Bolsa de Valores de Cabo Verde), Cameroon
(Bourse de Douala), BRVM (Cote d'Ivoire), Sierra Leone, Malawi, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Tanzania, the Seychelles, Zambia,
Namibia, Botswana, Mozambique, Mauritius and Ghana. Our primary source here was the national stock exchanges and their as-
sociated websites, and these were cross-checked against lists sourced from major brokerage houses to ensure accuracy, in the case of
Nigeria and Zambia. This resulted in a preliminary population of 380 stock listings.
At the second stage, to ensure that our population actually covered IPOs and not private placements, the IPO prospectuses were
obtained. The IPOs included are offerings that produced a genuine diversification of ownership among a base of minority share-
holders (as opposed to private placements involving the preferential allocation of stock with institutional or corporate block holders
in pre-arranged quantities and prices). Equally, care was taken to avoid misclassifications with registrations, introductions and
seasoned (secondary) offerings, as these are often also officially referred to as IPOs. Furthermore, IPOs are defined as offerings of
ordinary shares with single-class voting rights, that is, excluding preferred stock, convertibles, unit and investment trusts, as well as
readmissions, reorganizations, and demergers and transfers of shares between main and development boards. In lieu of these efforts
to solely focus on IPOs, our final population was reduced to 276 genuine IPO firms.
In the third stage, we focused on domestically listed private-sector firms, which led to the exclusion of state privatizations and
joint ventures – whose governance structures are very different from those of conventional firms. This brought the total number of
genuine private-sector IPOs down to 201. Finally, we found missing values in terms of published age – or year of IPO firm estab-
lishment – for two firms and missing disclosure of shares offered to retail investors at IPO for one firm. Additionally, it should be
noted that, in our later-stage modelling utilizing the two-stage IV probit configuration and STATA, all six observations in 2016 and
the one observation in 2009 are omitted due to collinearity with our binary dependent variable. This leaves our final sample
comprising 191 IPOs, with the ten missing values being distributed evenly throughout the sample.
Data on IPOs were collected from the financial market regulator websites for Algeria and Morocco, while a combination of
Thomson Corporation Perfect Information and Al Zawya databases was used for Egyptian prospectuses. The Al Zawya database, the
national stock exchange and direct contact with individual firms were used to source prospectuses for Tunisia. Similarly, in Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA), the prospectuses were obtained from the Ghanaian, Tanzanian, Cape Verdean, and Sierra Leone national stock
exchanges, and the exchange websites in the case of the Seychelles and Cameroon. The Thomson Corporation Perfect Information
database was used in the first instance to source prospectuses from Nigeria, Malawi and Kenya. Pangea Stockbrokers (Zambia) as well
as individual floated firms provided prospectuses for the Zambian stock market. Finally, in SSA, the African Financials website (2014)
provided information from annual reports relevant to listing. These sources are listed in Appendix Table 1.
Considerable care was taken in the interpretation of information from IPO listings prospectuses, given the considerable variation
in size and quality of these filings across the continent. Examples range from inaccuracies in values and units of measurement in
Egypt (such as units being stipulated in prospectuses as billions while additional verification confirmed the values to be denominated
in millions), to omissions and inaccuracies in the balance sheets in the prospectuses of many smaller Nigerian firms. Attempts to
verify data from prospectuses with additional sources such as firm websites, annual reports and mandatory filings of annual accounts
were made wherever possible.
We employed a variety of additional resources to identify and confirm the VC and BA investors within focal IPO firms in our
sample. Hence, we looked for further support in internet-based local media, stock exchange descriptions and regulatory filings. These
were also supplemented by analyses of the web-based resources of the Egyptian Private Equity Association (EPEA), the African Private
Equity and Venture Capital Association, and the South African Venture Capital and Private Equity Association (SAVCA).
The identification of BA investors is altogether more complex, owing to the inherent lack of transparency in these often extremely
informal markets. We build our identification in line with that undertaken by Bruton et al. (2010) in their study of the UK and France.
Consequently, we identified BAs through the prospectuses as those who had invested in the venture as private individuals, other than
those associated with founders, other board members, senior management, or VCs. We also supplemented our identification through
the extensive use of internet-based access to local indigenous media, to provide further verification (see Appendix Table 1). The use of
local media and business journals is essential in a region with BA markets that are notoriously informal in nature and with few, if any,
organized associations of angel investors.
2 South Africa and Namibia are examples of Easterly and Levine (1997)’s “settler based systems” which, following the initial transplantation of
Roman-Dutch civil-code institutional frameworks, evolved indigenously through an active Afrikaans-speaking (an ancient form of the Dutch lan-
guage) judiciary and population.
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The evidence from Table 1 reveals that Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Nigeria and Ghana account for the majority of IPOs across the
continent – and also account for the overwhelming majority of founder-led listings. Private equity activity, however, is more re-
flective of the size and prosperity of the indigenous economies. Thus, BA participation in firms is primarily concentrated in the North
African markets of Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia, along with Nigeria, while almost all domestic VC and all foreign VC activity is
concentrated in North Africa, with the notable exceptions of Nigeria and South Africa.
More generally, the evidence from Table 2 reveals that both VC and BA investment across Africa tends to be syndicated –
especially where target firms are deemed more risky in being entrepreneurial ventures led by their founders. This syndication
improves the ongoing monitoring and surveillance of investments (reduction of ex-post moral hazard) because multiple private equity
entities within a syndicate are able to assess each other's appraisals of the target investee firm (Barry et al., 1990; Sahlman, 1990).
Syndicate sizes of between three and four are typically observed in founder-led IPO firms for BAs (p≤0.10), domestic VCs (p≤0.01)
and foreign VCs (p≤0.05), as compared to between two and three for their non-founder led counterparts. Evidence regarding board
participation is much more mixed, with BAs (p≤0.10) and foreign VCs typically having higher levels of participation, with at least
one nominee director. It should be noted that board representation is typically undertaken by the syndicate lead, who typically
possesses the largest ownership holding. Finally, the number of investment exits at IPO is minimal across all categories of private
equity, while the proportion of IPO investment targets for which the private equity entity does not divest any ownership is ap-
proximately one third of the sample in each case. This would indicate that all private equity entities view the IPO as one step in a
much longer investment cycle than current theory based on the US and the lifecycle of the firm suggests.
Table 1
African IPO equity market characteristics for sample period 2000 to 2016.
Table providing descriptive statistics for all African IPOs between January 2000 and August 2016. Ns is final sample size of genuine private sector
IPO firms (omitting state privatization and foreign subsidiaries/joint ventures). Tribal index is sourced from University of South Florida from http://
usfglobalinitiative.org/ and is constructed from several underlying variables – all of whom are sourced and defined in Appendix Table 2. Institu-
tional quality is the equally weighted average of the six individual World Bank governance institutional quality indices developed by Kaufman et al.
(2009) across all markets with these having been rescaled on a 0–1 scale and then expressed as a percentage. These too are defined and sourced as in
Appendix Table 2. The final four columns represent the numbers of IPO firms per market that retain their founders as CEO at IPO, then of these the





Ns Number (#) of IPOs with the below categories of ownership and control per market
CEO-Founder Firms Non founder-led firms
Overall Business Angel Venture Capital Overall Business Angel Venture Capital
Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic
% % # # # # # # # # #
North Africa
Algeria 71.00 33.77 3 2 – 3 – 1 – 1 1
Egypt 68.00 38.94 11 6 11 1 6 5 6 2 3
Morocco 72.00 46.82 37 15 4 2 20 22 7 4 9
Tunisia 53.00 48.88 39 26 11 8 16 13 1 – 10
East Africa
Kenya 81.00 39.06 7 3 1 – 1 4 – – 1
Mauritius 51.00 72.11 13 5 2 – 3 8 – 2 –
Seychelles 51.00 56.15 3 2 – – – 1 – – –
Tanzania 64.00 42.95 7 2 – – – 5 1 – –
Rwanda 55.00 51.92 1 0 – – – 1 – – –
Uganda 71.00 39.37 1 1 – – – 0 – – –
West Africa
Nigeria 84.00 29.09 31 17 9 5 1 14 2 1 5
BVRM 70.83 42.22 6 1 – – – 5 1 9 –
Ghana 61.00 52.84 15 9 – – 1 6 6 2 1
Cape Verde Is. 35.00 58.62 1 0 – – – 1 – – –
Sierra Leone 68.00 36.08 1 1 – – – 0 – – –
Southern Africa
Botswana 46.00 68.88 7 3 2 1 2 4 – 4 0
Malawi 67.00 48.87 1 0 – – – 1 0 1 0
Zambia 72.00 46.88 2 1 – – – 1 – – –
Namibia 51.00 61.17 4 3 – – – 1 – 2 1
Mozambique 56.00 44.56 1 0 – – – 1 – – –
South Africa 52.00 59.26 10 6 4 4 2 4 – – 3
Overall 64.72 47.21 201 102 44 24 52 99 24 27 34
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3.2. Dependent variable
We follow Jain and Tabak (2008) in coding our binary dependent variable to take the value 1 if the founder is the CEO at IPO and
0 otherwise. This provides a simple decision rationale upon which to base our study.
3.3. Explanatory variables
We designate private equity ownership, the focus of our hypotheses, within the context of its two disaggregated components,
namely the percentage levels of pre-IPO ownership by BAs and VCs respectively. This corresponds to Hypothesis 1. All values were
sourced from in-depth studies of individual IPO listings prospectuses, providing data on pre- and post-IPO ownership structure,
including the equity stakes of all investors. We followed previous studies (e.g. Bruton et al., 2010) and used the percentage ratio of
the total number of ordinary shares a particular early-stage investor owned prior to the IPO, to the total number of firm shares prior
to the IPO.
Table 2
Private equity investment descriptive statistics.
Table provides descriptive statistics regarding private equity characteristics for the three types of private equity: Business Angels, Domestic and
Foreign Venture Capital. Their involvement and engagement in IPO firms that either retain their founders as CEO or have a professionalized CEO are
reported. In terms of involvement and #IPO firms with PE involvement is the total number of IPO firms that have that category of private equity
involvement. #Private equity involved in IPOs is the total absolute number of private equity entities participating in a given category of IPO firm
(founder retained or founder succession). In terms of ownership and #Exits is the total number of private equity exits, or full sale of entire holdings,
undergone in the IPO. #Private equity reducing holdings is the absolute number of private equity entities that used the IPO to reduce their holdings
(ownership). Mean ownership pre-IPO% and Mean ownership post-IPO% correspond to average size of holdings of each private equity entity prior
and following IPO. In terms of board participation and “% PE target IPO firms with Min. 1 PE director” corresponds to the percentage proportion of
private equity investments (namely the target IPO firms) that have at least one director as a nominated representative of private equity firm. “Mean
#PE directors in firms that have PE board participation” is the average number of private equity representative directors in investee target IPO firms
in those specific cases where nominee directors have been installed to monitor investments. In terms of investment strategy: syndication and “#IPO
firms with syndicates” is the total number of IPO firms with private equity syndicates (syndicated investment), “Mean % pre-IPO holding for
syndicate lead” is average holding for the syndicate lead, and “Mean % pre-IPO holding for syndicate subordinates” is average holding for the
syndicate subordinates. “Mean #All BA/VC in syndicate” is the average number of private equity entities involved in syndicate. Mean #VC in
syndicate and Mean #BA in syndicate are the average numbers of VC and BA within syndicate.
Business Angel Domestic VC Foreign VC
73 individuals 87 entities 47 entities
Founder=CEO Founder < >
CEO
Founder=CEO Founder < >
CEO
Founder=CEO Founder < >
CEO
Involvement
#IPO firms with PE involvement 26 19 24 21 14 16
#Private equity involved in IPOs 47 27 57 30 28 19
Ownership
#Exits 2 0 0 1 2 3
#Private equity reducing holdings 31 22 32 18 18 13
Mean ownership pre-IPO% 8.66% 6.45% 6.03%⁎ 9.39% 11.48% 16.48%
Mean ownership post-IPO% 4.69% 5.03% 5.94%† 8.08% 9.88% 13.68%
Board participation
% PE target IPO firms with Min. 1 PE
director
38.00%† 26.00% 31.00% 40.00% 45.00% 38.00%
Mean #PE directors in firms that have PE
board participation
1.00 1.00 1.92 1.00 1.90 2.20
Investment strategy: syndication
#IPO firms with syndicates 10 6 10 9 4 8
Mean % pre-IPO holding for syndicate lead 10.47% 7.91% 11.37% 10.84% 8.71% 16.84%
Mean % pre-IPO holding for syndicate
subordinates
4.81% 3.93% 5.86% 6.32% 4.16% 7.22%
Mean #All BA/VC in syndicate 3.11† 2.67 3.21⁎⁎⁎ 2.43 3.59⁎ 2.77
Mean #VC in syndicate – – 2.86⁎⁎⁎ 2.07 3.14⁎ 2.31⁎⁎
Mean # BA in syndicate 2.57† 2.04 – – – –
† p < 0.10.
⁎ p < 0.05.
⁎⁎ p < 0.01.
⁎⁎⁎ p < 0.005.
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3.4. Moderating variables
We used two institutional metrics to moderate the association between different categories of block ownership and firm-level
adoption of Anglo-American governance. The first institutional variable accounts for formal institutional quality, and is an aggregate
variable constructed from an equally weighted average of six World Bank governance metrics (Kaufman et al., 2009). Detailed
definitions of the six metrics are provided in Appendix Table 2. These six were rebased to a 0–10 scale prior to aggregation. The
second variable is the Tribalism index, accounting for informal societal institutions based on tribalism, recently developed by the
University of South Florida. The index is built as a composite of a number of distinct underlying metrics capturing the dynamics of
tribal institutional frameworks, as outlined in Appendix Table 2. The first of these underlying characteristics is corruption perceptions
capturing nepotism. The second is ethnic fractionalization, which develops from the concept of an ethnically fractious or hetero-
geneous society, while the third is the proportion of indigenous populations, which enables the tribalism measure to be generalized
internationally. The fourth is gender equality – capturing the degree of patriarchy or matriarchy within society, which is a central
feature of tribalism. The fifth is a measure capturing the degree of group grievance, which captures frictions within society – a
ubiquitous feature of tribal societies. We followed methods suggested by Liu et al. (2014) for exploring moderating effects with an
index. However, in order to mitigate the potential effects of collinearity, we centred and normalized both indices. We also recursively
added in each index, thereby avoiding their joint inclusion within any model. The use of these variables corresponds to Hypotheses 2
and 3.
3.5. Control variables
We incorporated six distinct sets of control variables. The first consists of institutional controls and includes a legal-origin binary
dummy (1/0), one denoting a civil-code-law regime, alongside an aggregate institutional quality index and a tribal index. The
inclusion of these indices was necessitated by our interactive analysis using the methodology of Liu et al. (2014).
We also needed to control for various governance factors that might determine CEO succession, as identified by prior agency-
grounded studies. Therefore, the second group consists of board controls, reflecting both executive decision monitoring and control
(Fama and Jensen, 1983) and the resource-dependence view of board members securing access to information and resources that
ensure the survival of a firm (Boyd, 1994; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). The latter perspective implies that non-executive directors
provide more boundary-spanning abilities, through access to valuable resources for the firm. Thus, we include controls for the natural
logarithm of board size, in terms of the total number of executive and nonexecutive directors, and an outsider nonexecutive ratio,
defined as the number of outside, independent and unaffiliated nonexecutives divided by board size, as well as the ratio of non-
executives drawn from social elite backgrounds to board size, and the ratio of the number of business-group-affiliated directors to
board size. These latter two ratios control for the potential presence of business groups and social elites, both of which are drawn
from the indigenous political economy and manifest themselves in terms of usurping control and legitimacy away from the founder,
or vying for such control and legitimacy.
The third group consists of four firm-specific controls. In line with Sanders and Carpenter (1998) and Finkelstein and Boyd (1998)
we use the natural logarithm of a firm's pre-tax revenues (or sales) in the last reported year prior to the IPO as a proxy for size,
assumed to control for the complexity of a given firm's operations and thus mirroring the complexity of the task environment, which
in turn is reflective of the information-processing requirements of the board. We adopt the accounting return on assets (ROA)3 in the
last reported year prior to the IPO as a measure of firm performance, in line with Finkelstein and Boyd (1998) and Khanna and Palepu
(2000). We also control for firm age, defined as the difference between IPO year and year of foundation, older firms being anticipated
to have larger, more complex operations, mirroring more complex task environments. This variable also controls for the “liability of
newness” and the considerable information asymmetries generated by a lack of operational and performance history (Arthurs et al.,
2008). Finally, following Andersen et al. (2003), we introduce the ratio of debt to equity, as a control for financial leverage or
gearing4 in the last reported year prior to the IPO. This variable captures the differential use of debt as opposed to equity, as a
governance mechanism, as well as providing a measure of the institutionalized religious prohibition of interest-based debt instru-
ments, which is prevalent in Islamic shari'ya informal institutions (Kuran, 2004).
The fourth group encompasses ownership control variables. We account for concentrated shareholdings of the CEO, family and
corporate block entities. Such concentrated ownership by the CEO facilitates their ability to decouple the firm and its economic assets
from the institutionalized notions of mutual co-ownership and reciprocity across the wider clan or extended family. Family ownership
represents a mechanism by which this entity can exert significant coercive institutional pressures on a firm's organizational structure
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Our third ownership control accounts for pre-flotation ownership by corporate block entities.
3 ROA is conventionally defined as ROA= (Net Income+ Interest ∗ (1− Tax Rate)) / Total Assets (see Khanna and Palepu, 2000). However, due
to significant variation in the data arising from varying reporting standards across Africa, with frequent omission of reported interest income and
corporate taxation rates from listings prospectuses, we used a modified version of this, namely ROA=Net Income / Total Assets. However, while
both measures suffer from business cycle effects and are not forward-looking, they do provide a representative indication of firm performance
subject to the data limitations prevalent in emerging economies.
4 In contrast to Bruton et al. (2010), where the ratio of debt to assets was used, we used the debt-to-equity ratio. While this is vulnerable to
variations between the static accounting valuation of equity and the market valuation, and is vulnerable to the business cycle, it both captures the
preference for the use of debt, and importantly the degree to which debt is used, and is at the same time a “rules-based” governance instrument
limiting managerial discretion and mitigating potential agency conflicts.
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The fifth group contains an IPO-specific control variable, to account for the demand for equity finance in terms of the demographic
marketing of shares offered at IPO to minority outsider retail investors. The ratio of shares offered at IPO to total shares issued and
outstanding post-IPO provides an indication of the willingness of the founder-CEO to incorporate the coercive institutional pressures,
arising from the active management processes of external investors, into the organizational structure.
3.6. Empirical model
A primary consideration in our choice of empirical model is that of causality arising from endogeneity issues. Endogeneity is a
significant concern in relation to the linear unidirectional association and expected causality between the dependent variable
(likelihood of founder being retained as CEO at IPO) and the pre-flotation ownership by private equity entities (BAs and VCs). This
renders the simple assumption of linear causality unreliable, with a probit or logistic model potentially overestimating the im-
portance of these ownership variables (Hamilton and Nickerson, 2003) in explaining the likelihood of the outcome. Consequently, we
follow Bruton et al. (2010) in adjusting for potential endogeneity between the dependent and explanatory independent variables by
applying an initial estimation step, using OLS, with exogenous instruments included on top of all the controls used in the main parts
of the analysis. However, given the incompatibility of errors between separately undertaken preliminary OLS and later-stage probit
models, we adopt the IV probit model with maximum likelihood estimation format. The exogenous variables selected are the numbers
of each category of private equity entity involved in each respective IPO, i.e. the numbers of BAs in the regression with dependent
variable BA pre-flotation ownership, then the numbers of domestic VCs with dependent variable domestic VC pre-flotation owner-
ship, then finally the numbers of foreign VC entities with foreign VC pre-flotation ownership as the dependent variable.
Our empirical model is the IV probit, which is estimated through two distinct steps. We use this because endogeneity implies that
one or more regressors is likely to be correlated with the error term in a conventional single-step probit model. The Newey (1987)
two-stage estimation process involves OLS as our first step, and probit modelling as our second. Formally, the model is
= + +
= + +
y y x u
y x x
i i i i
i i i i
1 2 1
2 1 1 2 2 (1)
where i=1, ……N, y2i is a 1× p vector of endogenous variables, x1i is a 1× k1 vector of exogenous variables, x2i is a 1× k2 vector
of additional instruments, and the equation for y2i is written in reduced form. By assumption, (ui,υi)~N(0,∑) where σ11 is normalized
to one to identify the model. β and γ are vectors of structural parameters, and Π1 and Π2 are matrices of reduced-form parameters.














The order condition for identification of structural parameters requires that k2 > p. Furthermore, the model is derived under the
assumption that (ui, υi) is independent and identically distributed multivariate normal for all i.
In practice, OLS regressions are run first between the endogenous variables and the instruments – where these include all exo-
genous variables too. There are only as many first-step OLS regressions as there are distinct endogenous variables – for which
appropriate orthogonal instruments should be identified and included alongside the exogenous variables. The errors from this first
step are then included in the second IV probit model – including representations of the endogenous variables alongside the exogenous
variables.
Two Wald test statistics are reported. The first is related to the null hypothesis that all parameter coefficients of the model(s) are
jointly equal to zero, with the test statistic following a χ2 (chi-square) distribution. The second focuses on the null hypothesis that the
υi in the first-step OLS model are equal to zero, and again distributed as a χ2 distribution. If these null hypotheses are rejected then the
covariates are indeed exogenous, while the overall model is of significance in its prediction capacity, i.e. the Wald statistic can be
viewed as a means of discriminating between rival IV probit models.
We test two sets of IV probit models, relating to each of our three hypotheses in turn. The first simply tests the likelihood that the
two private equity categories' (BAs' and VCs') cash flow ownership, as endogenous variables, influence the likelihood of the founder's
retention as CEO at IPO. This uses the numbers of BAs and VCs respectively as two orthogonal IVs. Our various categories of controls
form the exogenous variables, in addition to industry and time fixed effects. Two preliminary OLS regressions are run, with the
dependent variable in each case being the private equity ownership. In each regression, both IVs are included alongside each other –
namely the numbers of BAs and VCs respectively – in addition to the exogenous controls.
The second stage involves the final conditional probit modelling, with the dependent variable being the binary (1/0) likelihood of
the founder being retained as CEO at IPO. The independent variables are then estimates of, firstly, private equity ownership, and
then, the disaggregated BA and VC components of ownership, on top of the exogenous controls. Differences between countries
(institutional environments) are accounted for with the institutional quality controls. Additional country fixed effects are not used, so
as to avoid the dummy variable trap (Wooldridge, 2009)5 and a marked reduction in maximum likelihood in the final models, due to
5 If dummy variables for all country (and time) categories were included, their sum would equal 1 for all observations, which would be identical to
and hence perfectly correlated with the vector-of-ones variable whose coefficient is the constant term; if the vector-of-ones variable were also
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reduced informational content should they be included.6 However, industry and time (year) fixed effects are applied across all
models. Industry controls capture diversification differences – a key feature in business groups (Khanna and Palepu, 2000) – while
year effects relate to variations in institutional development and improvements in regulations, capital market culture, and surveil-
lance environment. The industry definitions vary across each country (see Khanna and Rivkin, 2001, for details of similar issues in a
comparable study of 14 emerging economies), leading us to adopt Bloomberg basic industry definitions.7
4. Results
The correlation patterns outlined in Table 3 indicate no multi-collinearity problems. This is also separately confirmed from
variance inflation factors which are all under 4. Furthermore, the correlations between the instruments (numbers of private equity
investors) and the dependent variable are both small in absolute value and lacking statistical significance, whereas the correlations
between the instruments and the potentially endogenous explanatory variables (i.e. ownership of private equity investors) are
strongly significant (Hamilton and Nickerson, 2003). Following Bruton et al. (2010), our choice of instruments to account for en-
dogeneity is supported by their high correlations with the private equity pre-flotation ownership and minimal correlations with all
other variables.
The results of our hypothesis tests from the second stage of the IV probit models are detailed in Table 4. The evidence statistically
supports the maintenance of our three proposed hypotheses. We observe a positive association between private equity pre-flotation
ownership and likelihood of founder as CEO at IPO (see Table 5, model 1), as proposed in Hypothesis 1. Drawing on the marginal
effects, and a one unit change in private equity pre-flotation ownership equates to a 2.28% increase in the likelihood of founder
retention as CEO at IPO.8 This association is inversely moderated by institutional quality (p≤0.01) (Table 4, model 2), which
provides statistical support for Hypothesis 2. Conversely, the association is positively moderated by the tribal index (p≤0.01)
(Table 4, model 3), which provides statistical support for Hypothesis 3. Again, using marginal effects, a one-unit change in moderation
by the tribal index equates to a 4.08% increase in the likelihood of founder retention as CEO at IPO.
In terms of the controls, the founder's retention as CEO at IPO is associated with a firm being located within a common as opposed
to a civil code law jurisdiction (p≤0.01), and with contexts characterized by weaker formal institutional quality (p≤0.10) and
lower levels of tribalism (p≤0.01). Founder retention at IPO is also associated with larger boards (p≤0.05), with fewer social elites
on boards (p≤0.05), and with business-group-affiliated nonexecutives (p≤0.10). Again, in terms of the marginal effects, this
implies that a one-unit increase in the board size, the proportion of social elites on the board and the ratio of business-group-affiliated
directors on the board would lead respectively to an increase of 127.10%, and decreases of 216.87% and 121.43% in the likelihood of
founder retention as CEO at IPO. Founder CEOs at IPO are also associated with smaller (p≤0.10) and younger (p≤0.01) firms and
less debt in relation to equity financing (p≤0.10). Retention of founder is also associated with elevated CEO and family ownership
(p≤0.01) and lower levels of corporate block ownership (p≤0.05), and with reduced dilution of the shareholder base (p≤0.01).
Finally, the Wald tests for exogeneity across all models are large, suggesting our models are robust. The underlying model (model
1), testing only the association between ownership of private equity and the dependent variable, has a Wald statistic of 91.90
(p≤0.01) with respect to a χ2 distribution, while the moderating models (models 2 and 3) have Wald statistics of 89.44 (p≤0.05)
and 114.17 (p≤ 0.01). This provides further statistical support for our choice of instruments, the respective numbers of each ca-
tegory of private equity, namely BAs and VCs. The largest negative log likelihood ratio is associated with model 3 in which we look at
moderation by the tribal index (−1469.98). It is only marginally higher than that of model 2 in which we look at moderation by
institutional quality (−1462.14). Both are considerably greater than that for the underlying model 1 (−778.98). This suggests that
the tribal index exerts a considerably greater impact as an institutional moderator than mere institutional quality. It also underscores
the importance of taking into consideration the contrasting impact of institutional context.
As a further robustness check, we disaggregated private equity ownership into the constituent proportions of BAs and both
domestic and foreign VCs. We re-estimated the three models reported in the preceding table using these three disaggregated pro-
portions in place of the earlier-used private equity. Our findings are reported in Table 5 and are broadly consistent with those
reported for generic private equity. However, one significant difference is apparent in terms of the inverse association between
foreign VCs and founder retention as CEO at IPO (p≤0.10), in model 4. This suggests that foreign VCs are governed more by US-
industry-centred norms than indigenous domestic VCs and BAs, who are more firmly rooted in the domestic context, this being
reflected in their greater understanding of the importance of relational contracting and the founder's social networks. The moderation
of all three disaggregated private equity ownership variables by institutional quality and the tribal index (models 5 and 6) yields
similar results to those for the aggregated private equity shown in Table 4, models 2 and 3.
(footnote continued)
present, this would result in perfect multicollinearity, so that the matrix inversion in the estimation algorithm would be impossible. This is referred
to as the dummy variable trap (Wooldridge, 2009).
6 We have separately run all models with and without additional binary country effects as an extra robustness check. Their addition caused a
substantial reduction in the maximum likelihood and the related informational content of the models, as reflected by reduced Akaike and Schwarz-
Bayesian criteria (AIC and SBC).
7 The industry classifications are Basic Materials; Consumer Goods Non-Cyclical; Consumer Goods Cyclical; Energy; Financials; Health; Industrials;
Technology; Telecommunications; Utilities. The identification of firms according to their industry using broad Bloomberg definitions is in keeping
with the data limitations across our sample, a characteristic prevalent in emerging economies.
8 All marginal effects are excluded owing to brevity concerns, but are available from the authors upon request.




This table reports the Pearson correlations between all variables included in our study. These are the binary dependent variables, namely adopting
value 1 if IPO firm retains founder as CEO at IPO and 0 otherwise. Explanatory variables are the percentage levels of pre-IPO ownership by private
equity (PE) (both BA and VC) alongside the number of private equity entities – which is our instrumental variable used in later IV-Probit estimation.
Institutional controls are legal origin binary dummy (adopting value 1 if civil code law and 0 if common law jurisdiction) and aggregate institutional
quality. Board controls are natural logarithm of board size and board independence ratio, ratio of social elite nonexecutives to board size as well as
ratio of nonexecutives affiliated to business group entities to board size. Firm-specific controls are the natural logarithm of firm revenues, ROA –
defined as accounting return on equity divided by total assets, natural logarithm of firm age and debt-to-equity ratio. Ownership controls are
percentage pre-IPO ownership by CEO, family and corporate block entities. IPO control is proportion of shares offered to total shares issued.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1 Founder retained as CEO 1.000
2 BA ownership 0.103 1.000
3 VC Domestic ownership 0.057 0.074 1.000
4 VC foreign ownership −0.055 −0.019 −0.060 1.000
5 # BA 0.112 0.799⁎⁎ 0.096 −0.056 1.000
6 # VC Domestic 0.069 −0.001 0.683⁎⁎ −0.047 0.051 1.000
7 # VC foreign −0.025 0.011 −0.060 0.693⁎⁎ −0.002 −0.040 1.000
8 Civil Code Law (Legal
Origin)
−0.027 0.017 0.133 −0.001 0.048 0.187⁎⁎ 0.011 1.000
9 Institutional Quality −0.052 −0.149⁎ 0.007 −0.061 −0.082 0.048 −0.038 0.213⁎⁎ 1.000
10 Tribal index −0.054 0.102 −0.040 0.014 0.044 −0.038 −0.011 −0.296⁎⁎ −0.808⁎⁎ 1.000
11 Log (Board Size) −0.149⁎ −0.008 0.149⁎ 0.009 −0.059 0.178⁎ 0.079 0.156⁎ −0.116 0.199⁎⁎ 1.000
12 Board Independence Ratio 0.012 0.052 −0.024 0.002 0.061 −0.042 0.024 −0.268⁎⁎ 0.181⁎ −0.122 −0.091
13 Ratio social elites −0.090 0.035 −0.211⁎⁎ −0.058 −0.010 −0.232⁎⁎ −0.093 −0.445⁎⁎ −0.214⁎⁎ 0.259⁎⁎ −0.075
14 Ratio Business Group
Directors
−0.066 0.018 −0.095 −0.036 0.016 0.051 0.043 0.347⁎⁎ −0.055 0.003 0.168⁎
15 Log (Revenues) −0.072 0.005 −0.064 0.182⁎⁎ −0.036 0.015 0.199⁎⁎ 0.158⁎ −0.062 0.104 0.280⁎⁎
16 ROA 0.080 0.016 0.031 0.006 0.019 0.015 0.011 0.041 −0.004 0.050 0.006
17 Log (Firm Age) −0.296⁎⁎ 0.048 0.035 0.040 −0.018 0.016 −0.004 0.141⁎ −0.150⁎ 0.244⁎⁎ 0.348⁎⁎
18 Debt to Equity Ratio −0.072 −0.038 0.221⁎⁎ −0.016 −0.037 0.167⁎ −0.005 −0.061 −0.078 0.104 −0.042
19 CEO ownership 0.381⁎⁎ −0.008 −0.080 −0.080 0.009 −0.118 −0.065 −0.116 0.119 −0.143⁎ −0.379⁎⁎
20 Family ownership 0.160⁎⁎ −0.069 −0.074 −0.101 −0.087 0.067 −0.091 0.433⁎⁎ −0.039 0.014 0.131
21 Corporate block ownership −0.241⁎ −0.126 −0.128 −0.045 −0.110 −0.127 −0.021 −0.180⁎ 0.101 −0.079 −0.146⁎
22 Shares to retail investors/
total shares
−0.114 −0.104 −0.091 −0.117 −0.085 −0.164⁎ −0.124 −0.386⁎⁎ −0.095 0.083 −0.033
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
1 Founder retained as CEO
2 BA ownership
3 VC Domestic ownership
4 VC foreign ownership
5 # BA
6 # VC Domestic
7 # VC foreign
8 Civil Code Law (Legal Origin)
9 Institutional Quality
10 Tribal index
11 Log (Board Size)
12 Board Independence Ratio 1.000
13 Ratio social elites 0.159⁎ 1.000
14 Ratio Business Group
Directors
−0.272⁎⁎ −0.087 1.000
15 Log (Revenues) 0.080 −0.126 0.226⁎⁎ 1.000
16 ROA 0.026 −0.030 0.009 0.192⁎⁎ 1.000
17 Log (Firm Age) −0.063 −0.134 0.099 0.289⁎⁎ 0.124 1.000
18 Debt to Equity Ratio 0.068 −0.060 −0.044 0.006 −0.018 −0.001 1.000
19 CEO ownership 0.091 −0.030 −0.284⁎⁎ −0.209⁎⁎ −0.012 −0.276⁎⁎ −0.040 1.000
20 Family ownership −0.261⁎⁎ −0.203⁎⁎ 0.549⁎⁎ 0.160⁎ 0.112 0.207⁎⁎ −0.069 −0.242⁎⁎ 1.000
21 Corporate block ownership 0.277⁎⁎ 0.166⁎ −0.259⁎⁎ −0.122 −0.115 −0.145⁎ −0.030 −0.215⁎⁎ −0.388⁎⁎ 1.000
22 Shares to retail investors/total
shares
0.121 0.211⁎⁎ −0.215⁎⁎ −0.291⁎⁎ −0.108 −0.175⁎ −0.004 −0.037 −0.274⁎⁎ 0.172⁎ 1.000⁎⁎⁎
⁎ p < 0.05.
⁎⁎ p < 0.01.
⁎⁎⁎ p < 0.005.
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The associations between all controls and founder retention as CEO at IPO are similar to those reported in Table 4 for aggregate
private equity. Finally, the Wald tests for exogeneity across all models are large, suggesting our models are robust. The underlying
model (model 4), testing only the association between pre-flotation ownership by private equity and the dependent variable, has a
Wald statistic of 97.56 (p≤0.01) with respect to a χ2 distribution, while the moderating models (models 5 and 6) have Wald
statistics of 181.29 (p≤0.01) and 143.07 (p≤0.01). However, the log likelihood statistics are almost twice the absolute size of those
reported in Table 3, where aggregate private equity ownership is considered. Again, moderation by the tribal index leads to the
largest log likelihood (−3429.85), while there is a sizeable drop for moderation by institutional quality (−3263.81), and then again
to the underlying-associations model 4, where log likelihood is −1800.85. This evidence again suggests the importance of con-
sidering tribalism in society over and above formal institutional quality.
Finally, we undertook four additional robustness checks on our models. The results of these are omitted for brevity but are
available from the authors upon request. The first was to substitute post-IPO retained ownership for both private equity and its three
disaggregated components, namely BAs, domestic and foreign VCs, and re-run all of our models. The results were consistent with our
models reported here using pre-IPO ownership. Secondly, we re-ran all models including country binary effects. The corresponding
Table 4
Private equity ownership determinants of founder retention as CEO at IPOa,b.
This table reports the results from the instrumental variable (IV) probit regressions the binary (1/0) likelihood of founder retained as CEO at IPO
onto our explanatory and control variables – where these are defined in Table 2.
Likelihood of founder retained as CEO at IPO
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Intercept 2.343 [1.53]† 3.081 [1.56]⁎ 2.783 [1.48]⁎
Independent variables
H1: PE pre-IPO own 0.023 [0.02]† 0.021 [0.02]† 0.018 [0.02]†
BA own – – –
Domestic VC own – – –
Foreign VC own – – –
H2: PE pre-IPO own× Institutional quality −0.031 [0.02]⁎
BA own× Institutional quality – – –
Domestic VC own× Institutional quality – – –
Foreign VC own× Institutional quality – – –
H3: PE pre-IPO own×Tribal index 0.041 [0.01]⁎⁎⁎
BA own×Tribal index – – –
Domestic VC own×Tribal index – – –
Foreign VC own×Tribal index – – –
Institutional controls
Civil code law (legal origin) −1.681 [0.45]⁎⁎⁎ −2.015 [0.50]⁎⁎⁎ −1.896 [0.44]⁎⁎⁎
Institutional quality −0.238 [0.16]† 0.030 [0.22] –
Tribal index – – −0.469 [0.17]⁎⁎⁎
Board controls
Log (board size) 1.124 [0.43]⁎⁎⁎ 1.211 [0.43]⁎⁎⁎ 1.271 [0.41]⁎⁎⁎
Board independence ratio 0.741 [0.83] 0.555 [0.83] 0.208 [0.73]
Ratio social elites on board −2.388 [0.90]⁎⁎⁎ −2.358 [0.88]⁎⁎⁎ −2.169 [0.86]⁎⁎
Ratio business group directors −0.810 [0.44]⁎ −0.953 [0.44]⁎ −1.214 [0.40]⁎⁎⁎
Firm-specific controls
Log (firm revenues) −0.025 [0.07] −0.045 [0.07] −0.033 [0.07]
ROA 0.642 [0.45]† 0.578 [0.44]† 0.646 [0.41]†
Log (firm age) −1.031 [0.20]⁎⁎⁎ −1.083 [0.20]⁎⁎⁎ −1.022 [0.20]⁎⁎⁎
Debt to equity ratio −0.007 [0.01]⁎⁎⁎ −0.009 [0.01]⁎⁎⁎ −0.009 [0.01]⁎⁎⁎
Ownership (pre-IPO) controls
CEO own 0.041 [0.01]⁎⁎⁎ 0.040 [0.01]⁎⁎⁎ 0.037 [0.01]⁎⁎⁎
Family own 0.030 [0.01]⁎⁎⁎ 0.031 [0.01]⁎⁎⁎ 0.031 [0.01]⁎⁎⁎
Corporate block own −0.009 [0.01]† −0.011 [0.01]† −0.013 [0.01]⁎
IPO control
Shares to retail investors to total shares −1.913 [0.72]⁎⁎⁎ −2.230 [0.72]⁎⁎⁎ −2.215 [0.73]⁎⁎⁎
No. observations 191 191 191
No. retained founder 95 95 95
No. succession founder 96 96 96
Log pseudo-likelihood −778.98 −1462.14 −1469.98
Wald exogeneity test (No. variables) 3.30 [1]† 5.17 [2]† 11.82 [2]⁎⁎⁎
Wald statistic (No. variables) 91.90 [37]⁎⁎⁎ 89.44 [38]⁎⁎⁎ 114.17 [38]⁎⁎⁎
a Industry and time (year) fixed effects included in all models.
b Robust standard errors-statistics are in parentheses.
† p < 0.10.
⁎ p < 0.05.
⁎⁎ p < 0.01.
⁎⁎⁎ p < 0.005.
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results yielded statistically stronger associations between the dependent variable and all independent variables. However, this was at
a cost of reduced log pseudo-likelihood and a notable decrease in all information criterion metrics associated with all models. Thirdly,
we studied the possibility of collinearity between numbers of private equity entities, ownership and the dependent variable. Here, we
estimated the first-stage reduced-form OLS regression model with private equity ownership as the dependent variable and number of
private equity owners as the independent variable on top of all of our controls. The overall F statistic revealed the rejection of the
hypothesis that all coefficients are jointly equal to zero, while the F statistic associated with a single coefficient, namely that of the
number of private equity owners, being equal to zero was rejected too. The residuals from this first-stage reduced-form regression
model were then included in the second-stage probit model alongside private equity ownership. Here, the null hypothesis was for
their coefficient to be statistically equal to zero, but our results indicate this should be rejected (p≤0.10). This rejection was
statistically borderline but provides some evidence indicative of private equity ownership being endogenous. This supports our
application of the two-stage approach with IV probit. Finally, as our fourth robustness check, we re-estimate all models replacing
return on assets (ROA) with return on sales (ROS). The evidence closely supports our original results using ROA.
As a final exercise, using the model parameters, we input a range of values for private equity pre-flotation ownership post-IPO and
Table 5
Private equity ownership determinants of founder retention as CEO at IPOa,b.
This table reports the results from the instrumental variable (IV) probit regressions the binary (1/0) likelihood of founder retained as CEO at IPO
onto our explanatory and control variables – where these are defined in Table 2.
Likelihood of founder retained as CEO at IPO
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Intercept 2.362 [1.57]† 3.727 [1.39]⁎⁎⁎ 3.258 [1.40]⁎⁎
Independent variables
H1: PE pre-IPO own
BA own 0.055 [0.03]⁎ 0.027 [0.03]⁎ 0.032 [0.02]⁎
Domestic VC own 0.020 [0.02] 0.039 [0.02]† 0.022 [0.02]†
Foreign VC own −0.019 [0.02]⁎ −0.023 [0.02]⁎ −0.019 [0.01]⁎
H2: PE pre-IPO own× Institutional quality
BA own× Institutional quality – −0.019 [0.03]† –
Domestic VC own× Institutional quality – −0.033 [0.07] –
Foreign VC own× Institutional quality – −0.031 [0.02]† –
H3: PE pre-IPO own×Tribal index
BA own×Tribal index – – 0.037 [0.03]⁎
Domestic VC own×Tribal index – – 0.029 [0.03]†
Foreign VC own×Tribal index – – 0.033 [0.02]⁎⁎
Institutional controls
Civil code law (legal origin) −1.844 [0.48]⁎⁎⁎ −2.057 [0.54]⁎⁎⁎ −2.154 [0.44]⁎⁎⁎
Institutional quality −0.232 [0.16]† −0.084 [0.20] –
Tribal index – – −0.485 [0.18]⁎⁎⁎
Board controls
Log (board size) 1.247 [0.44]⁎⁎⁎ 0.846 [0.48]⁎ 1.427 [0.39]⁎⁎⁎
Board independence ratio 0.508 [0.87] 0.870 [0.93] 0.168 [0.79]
Ratio social elites on board −2.706 [0.92]⁎⁎⁎ −3.025 [0.90]⁎⁎⁎ −2.744 [0.85]⁎⁎⁎
Ratio business group directors −0.838 [0.44]⁎ −0.922 [0.47]⁎ −1.249 [0.41]⁎⁎⁎
Firm-specific controls
Log (firm revenues) 0.025 [0.08] 0.042 [0.08] 0.024 [0.08]
ROA 0.552 [0.45]† 0.375 [0.33] 0.484 [0.40]†
Log (firm age) −1.040 [0.20]⁎⁎⁎ −1.093 [0.22]⁎⁎⁎ −1.136 [0.19]⁎⁎⁎
Debt to equity ratio −0.006 [0.01]⁎ −0.006 [0.01] −0.008 [0.01]⁎
Ownership (pre-IPO) controls
CEO own 0.042 [0.01]⁎⁎⁎ 0.041 [0.01]⁎⁎⁎ 0.038 [0.01]⁎⁎⁎
Family own 0.030 [0.01]⁎⁎⁎ 0.030 [0.01]⁎⁎⁎ 0.030 [0.01]⁎⁎⁎
Corporate block own −0.009 [0.01]† −0.015 [0.01]⁎ −0.016 [0.01]⁎
IPO control
Shares to retail investors to total shares −2.124 [0.74]⁎⁎⁎ −1.977 [0.87]⁎ −2.778 [0.69]⁎⁎⁎
No. observations 191 191 191
No. retained founder 95 95 95
No. succession founder 96 96 96
Log pseudo-likelihood −1800.85 −3263.81 −3429.85
Wald exogeneity test (No. variables) 6.91 [3]† 32.83 [6]⁎⁎⁎ 36.40 [6]⁎⁎⁎
Wald statistic (No. variables) 97.56 [39]⁎⁎⁎ 181.29 [42]⁎⁎⁎ 143.07 [42]⁎⁎⁎
a Industry and time (year) fixed effects included in all models.
b Robust standard errors-statistics are in parentheses.
† p < 0.10.
⁎ p < 0.05.
⁎⁎ p < 0.01.
⁎⁎⁎ p < 0.005.
B. Hearn and I. Filatotchev Journal of Business Venturing xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
15
institutional quality to produce a 3-dimensional probability surface with respect to the likelihood of the founder being retained as
CEO at IPO. This is outlined in Fig. 2. There is a single transition visible in relation to variation in formal institutional quality. At
lower levels of institutional quality (under 0.50 or 50% quality), founder retention at IPO is associated with almost all levels of
private equity participation in the firm. This transitions to the result of higher institutional quality meaning that virtually all levels of
private equity retained ownership are associated with founder succession at IPO.
We repeat this exercise with respect to the variation of the likelihood of founder's retention as CEO at IPO, and varying levels of
private equity pre-flotation ownership, where this is moderated by the tribal index. This is represented in Fig. 3. Two distinct
transitions are visible. The first occurs at low levels of tribalism, where increasing levels of pre-listing private equity ownership are
associated with a dramatic drop in the likelihood of founder retention. The second occurs at correspondingly high levels of tribalism,
where increasing private equity pre-listing ownership is associated with a much higher likelihood of founder retention. This is in line
with the theoretical expectations outlined in our hypotheses.
5. Discussion
In this paper, we examine the influence of private equity pre-flotation ownership on the likelihood of the founder's retention as
CEO at IPO. Furthermore, we extend these insights in considering the impact of institutional context – and in particular formal
institutional quality as well as the degree of tribalism within society. Drawing on a unique sample of 191 firms at IPO across the
African continent from 2000 to 2016, we find that private equity pre-flotation ownership is associated with founder retention at IPO.
This is in contrast to evidence from Wassermann (2003) in the context of developed economies, where the firm's growth merits its
growing requirements for resources that need to be sourced from external markets. This in effect places a constraint on the usefulness
of founder networks in providing resources to the early-stage entrepreneurial venture, within the lifecycle view of the firm's evo-
lution. Our research questions this argumentation in the context of emerging economies, where founder resources have accentuated
importance due to institutional deficiencies and a lack of support for external market intermediation, as well as the ubiquitous
presence of powerful sociological constructs, such as ethnic lineages and extended clans. These latter constructs are captured under
the term of tribalism.
Our research makes a contribution to prior studies on the governance roles of early-stage investors, by showing that their gov-
ernance outcomes are significantly shaped by their portfolio firm's institutional environment. In emerging markets, the role of the
founder appears to be of fundamental importance, in terms of personal charisma providing legitimacy that is inextricably tied into the
dispositional or character legitimacy of the firm – where the firm itself is deemed by external constituencies to share congruous norms
and traits. The founder is also extensively associated with brand and reputation, which in tribal societies is closely associated with the






















































Formal institutional quality, Normalized (-2 to +2)
0.00-0.10 0.10-0.20 0.20-0.30 0.30-0.40 0.40-0.50 0.50-0.60 0.60-0.70 0.70-0.80 0.80-0.90 0.90-1.00
Fig. 2. Probability surface of association between founder-CEO at IPO, private equity pre-IPO ownership and formal institutional quality.
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especially in institutional contexts where markets for critical resources are relatively under-developed. This integration of institu-
tional theory with the resource-based view and agency-grounded perspectives provides a novel contribution to founder-CEO suc-
cession research.
More generally, our study contributes to the entrepreneurship literature in terms of emphasizing the adoption of institutionalist
perspectives that consider how historical contingency and a far broader range of institutions may shape the governance of a founder-
led firm, rather than the over-simplified agency-theoretic approach. Agency's exclusive focus on the dichotomous relationship be-
tween principal and managerial agent – where the latter is considered to be the founder divesting ownership to minority principals –
can be thought of as dyadic reductionalism. It also considers an institutional context within which all governance arrangements are
inextricably embedded as no more than a thin institutional veil, supporting solely external contracting. Thus, it overlooks more
contextually driven explanations of governance – such as those that consider institutional voids and the influence of legitimacy with
respect to deeper tribal, ethnic or extended-clan-based formations in society. In this way, we contribute to the executive succession
literature through our consideration of the influence of rival institutionalized logics in shaping the preferences of executive suc-
cession. We tie founder succession to contrasting notions of external versus internal or relational contracting. In this way, we un-
dertake an integration of rival resource-dependence and institution-theoretic perspectives, in the specific context of founder's suc-
cession as CEO at the IPO juncture.
Our study has managerial implications. It underlines the importance of viewing relational contracting as an equal to its market-
based, external counterpart, the latter dominating the literature. In particular, our research shows that founders have considerable
institutional legitimacy that facilitates their ability to procure resources through relational means, in contexts where external in-
termediation may be ineffective due to institutional voids and the presence of tribalism. However, as emerging economies develop,
their formal institutions become more effective, which may, therefore, reduce the salience of the “founder imprint”. Investors in
entrepreneurial firms in emerging markets need to have a balanced view on the juxtaposition of formal and informal institutions in
any specific emerging economy, when evaluating the benefits of “professionalization” of their portfolio firms.
Our study has a number of limitations. The first is that our sample is limited to the African continent and, while it explicitly
addresses known relational contracting constructs within tribal societies, such as Ubuntu and Wasta, an interesting extension would
be to include all IPOs over the same time period across the wider Arab and Middle Eastern region, where these relational constructs
are also present. This would provide further confirmation of our findings across a much wider population. The second limitation is
methodological, as IV probit two-stage methods accounting for endogeneity do not take into account the statistical effects of hier-
archical levels in the data. While the reverse is true in terms of hierarchical linear models with a binary dependent variable not being
fully compatible with the two-stage estimation procedure due to the incompatibility of the distributional assumptions of their errors,
this is a statistical shortcoming worth noting. The third limitation is that we do not capture or control for the investment stage, which






























































Tribalism index, Normalized (-2.8 to +1.6)
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Fig. 3. Probability surface of association between founder-CEO at IPO, private equity pre-IPO ownership and tribal index.
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transparency leading to restrictions on availability of data, and will thus be more problematic to remedy.
6. Conclusions
Since an IPO represents a critical juncture in the firm's lifecycle, prior studies suggest that careful consideration should be given to
whether an original founder should abdicate power and control to facilitate a successful transition. Private equity investors, with
their enhanced access to factor markets and managerial expertise, are more likely to “professionalize” their portfolio firms at the exit
stage of their investment, but mostly in the context of developed institutions. Our analysis shows that the benefits of founder-CEO
succession are contingent on a complex interplay of formal and informal institutions, and future research should develop a more




Table documenting a non-exhaustive representation of data and information sources from across Africa.
Market Information source
North Africa Databases: Al Zawya (see website at: http://www.zawya.com/); Mubasher investment reporting (http://www.mubasher.net/en/Index.aspx);
Bloomberg LLP; Business Week
Algeria Websites: Bourse d'Algérie [SGBV] (http://www.sgbv.dz); Commission d'Organization et des Surveillance des Opérations de Bourse [COSOB]
(http://www.cosob.org/)
Telephone interviews and direct correspondence: M. Hamdi and Mme. Haffar (Bourse d'Alger)
Egypt Websites: Egyptian Stock Exchange [EGX] (http://www.egx.com.eg/english/homepage.aspx);
The Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority (http://www.efsa.gov.eg/content/IFIE/about_efsa.html); Central Bank of Egypt (http://www.
cbe.org.eg/English/)
Telephone interviews (unstructured) to obtain data: Mohammed Omran (Chairman, EGX)
Cairo-based interviews: Ayman Raafat (Market Control, EGX); Hebatallah El Serafi (Research & Market Development, EGX); Yasmin El-Khatib
(PR & Communications, EGX)
Morocco Websites: Bourse de Casablanca (http://www.casablanca-bourse.com/); Le Conseil Déontologique des Valeurs Mobilières [CDVM] (http://
www.cdvm.gov.ma/)
Casablanca-based interviews to obtain data: Mme. Meryem Tazi (Chef de Produits, Service Marketing, Bourse de Casablanca); Mme. Amina
Zouaoui (Analyste, Service Négociation, Bourse de Casablanca)
Tunisia Websites: Bourse de Tunis (http://www.bvmt.com.tn/); Conseil du Marché Financier [CMF] (http://www.cmf.org.tn/); Central Bank of
Tunisia (http://www.bct.gov.tn/)
Tunis-based interviews: M. Hatem Zribi (Direction de la Promotion du Marché, Bourse de Tunis); Mme. Maher Chtourou (Banque Centrale de
Tunisie library)
Tunis-based procurement of data from library of African Development Bank
Sub Saharan Afr-
ica
Databases: African financials annual reports (http://www.africanfinancials.com/); Invest Africa annual reports (http://investinginafrica.net/
african-stock-markets/); Thomson Perfect Information portal; Bloomberg LLP; Business Week
East Africa
Kenya Websites: Nairobi securities exchange (https://www.nse.co.ke/); Capital Markets Authority Kenya (http://www.cma.or.ke/); Daily Nation
business journal (http://www.nation.co.ke/)
Local Nairobi-based interviews: Public relations officer, Nairobi Stock Exchange; Investment Manager, Suntra Investment Bank, Kenya
Mauritius Websites: Stock Exchange of Mauritius [SEM] (http://www.stockexchangeofmauritius.com/)
Seychelles Websites: Trop-X Seychelles stock exchange (http://www.trop-x.com/)
Tanzania Websites: Dar Es Salaam stock exchange (http://www.dse.co.tz/)
Telephone procurement of listing prospectus from M. Stimali, Tanzania Tea Packers Ltd
Rwanda Websites: Rwanda stock exchange (http://rse.rw/); Capital Market Authority (http://cma.rw/)
Uganda Websites: Uganda securities exchange [USE] (http://www.use.or.ug/); Capital Markets Authority (http://www.cmauganda.co.ug/)
Procurement of annual reports: Kampala-based USE library
Kampala-based interviews: Investment Management team, Crane Bank, Kampala; Head of trading, USE trading floor, Kampala; Investment
Manager, African Alliance Securities, Kampala; Head of equities trading, Standard Chartered Bank, Kampala
West Africa
Nigeria Websites: Nigerian stock exchange [NSE] (http://www.nse.com.ng/Pages/default.aspx); Securities and Exchange Commission Nigeria (http://
www.sec.gov.ng/)
Lagos-based procurement of annual reports and listings prospectuses from NSE library, Lagos
Lagos-based interviews: M. Obaseki (President of Operations, NSE); Mme. Hauwa M. Audu (Founder CEO, Amyn Investments and
stockbroking, Lagos)
BVRM Websites: BRVM main site (http://www.brvm.org)
Cote d'Ivoire:
Procurement of annual reports: Abidjan (Cote d'Ivoire)-based library for BRVM
Abidjan-based interviews:
BRVM exchange: Emmanuel Zamble (Market operations manager, BRVM); Khassim Diop (Chargée de développement du Marché, BRVM);
Abdoulaye Sogoba (Assistant chargée de la formation, BRVM)
Abidjan brokers: M. Auguste Kouakou (Gniman-Finance SA, Abidjan); M. Hermann Boua (Hudson et Cie, Abidjan)
Mali: Bamako-based interviews: M. Amadou Djeri Bocoum (Directeur de l'Antenne Nationale de Bourse du Mali, Bamako); M. Alassane Sissoko
(Responsable des études et de la négociation, Société de Gestion et d'Intermédiation (SGI) du Mali SA, Bamako)
(continued on next page)
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Appendix Table 1 (continued)
Market Information source
Ghana Websites: Ghana stock exchange (http://www.gse.com.gh/)
Accra-based interviews:
Ghana stock exchange: Worlanyo Amoa (Senior Manager, Research and Product Devlopment, GSE)
Ghana Brokers: Armah I. J. Akotey (Vice President, Databank Brokerage and Investment Banking, Accra, Ghana); Edem Akpenyo (HFC
Brokerage Services, Accra, Ghana); Kafui Asare (Head of Client Relations, SAS Investment Management, Accra, Ghana); Haruna Gariba (Head
of Client Relations, Merchant Bank of Ghana Ltd., Accra, Ghana)
Cameroon Websites: Doula stock exchange (http://www.douala-stock-exchange.com/)
Cape Verde Website: Cape Verde stock exchange [BVC] (http://www.bvc.cv/)
Telephone based interviews and procurement of data: Edmilson Mendonça (Operations Manager, BVC); Ronnie Machado (Compliance
Manager, BVC)
Sierra Leone Telephone-based interviews and procurement of data: M. Gibrilla Sesay (Operations Manager, Sierra Leone stock exchange); M. Michael Collier
(Deputy President, Rokel Commercial Bank, Freetown, Sierra Leone); Jacob Kanu and Daniel Thomas (CEO's of independent local licensed
stockbrokers, Freetown)
Southern Africa
Botswana Website: Botswana stock exchange [BSE] (http://www.bse.co.bw/)
Telephone interviews and data procurement: Kopane Bolokwe (Operations officer, BSE)
Gabarone-based interviews with Head of Operations, BSE; President of Stock Brokers Botswana
Malawi Websites: Malawi stock exchange [MSE] (http://www.mse.co.mw/); The Nation business journal (http://mwnation.com/)
Zambia Websites: Lusaka stock exchange [LuSE] (http://www.luse.co.zm/); The Post business journal (Zambia) (http://www.postzambia.com/)
Telephone-based procurement: Mme. Sitali Mugala (Operations Manager, Lusaka stock exchange)
Lusaka-based interviews: LuSE operations personnel
Namibia Websites: Namibia stock exchange [NSX] (http://nsx.com.na/)
Windhoek-based data procurement from NSX building and library
Telephone based procurement: John Mandy (CEO, NSX); Loide Nakanduungile (Research Manager, NSX); Manda Steynberg (Operations
Manager, NSX)
Mozambique Websites: Bolsa de Valores de Maputo [BVM] (http://www.bvm.co.mz/)
Maputo-based interviews: Señor Bruno Tembe (Técnico Superior, BVM); Señor Felisberto Navalha (Operations Manager, Central Bank of
Mozambique)
Maputo-based procurement from Central Bank of Mozambique annex library, Baixa, Maputo
South Africa Websites: Johannesburg stock exchange [JSE] (https://www.jse.co.za/)
Appendix Table 2
Institutional measures data sources.
Formal institutional quality Definition
Worldwide Governance measures
Voice and Accountability Capturing perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as
well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media
Political Stability and Absence of Viol-
ence/Terrorism
capturing perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically-motivated violence, including terrorism
Government Effectiveness Capturing perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence
from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's
commitment to such policies
Regulatory Quality Capturing perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that
permit and promote private sector development
Rule of Law Capturing perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in
particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of
crime and violence
Control of Corruption Capturing perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand
forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and private interests
Underlying Source: The WGI are based on a large number of different data sources, capturing the views and experiences of survey
respondents and experts in the public and private sectors, as well as various NGOs. These data sources include: (a)
surveys of households and firms (e.g. Afrobarometer surveys, Gallup World Poll, and Global Competitiveness Report
survey), (b) NGOs (e.g. Global Integrity, Freedom House, Reporters Without Borders), (c) commercial business
information providers (e.g. Economist Intelligence Unit, Global Insight, Political Risk Services), and (d) public sector
organizations (e.g. CPIA assessments of World Bank and regional development banks, the EBRD Transition Report,
French Ministry of Finance Institutional Profiles Database). For a complete list of sources used in the current update of
the WGI refer to http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#faq
Tribal index Definition
Tribalism index Tribalism Index=Corruption Measure +0.5(Ethnic Fractionalism)+ 0.5(Indigenous Population)+2(Gender
Equality)+Group Grievance
The index has a 0–1 scale and is sourced from University of South Florida. http://usfglobalinitiative.org/
Corruption Measure
(continued on next page)
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Appendix Table 2 (continued)
Formal institutional quality Definition
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) published annually by Transparency International to gauge relative perceptions of
corruption. Information specific to the Corruption Perceptions Index can be found on their website at: http://www.
transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/about
Ethnic Fractionalism Alberto Alesina et al.'s work of ethnic and linguistic fractionalization presents what is, in conjunction with the use of
indigenous populations as a percentage of the national population, one of the most interesting component of the
Tribalism Index. See: Alesina et al. (2003)
Indigenous Population This is the percentage of the population that is indigenous. Data about demographic variables such as ancestry,
ethnicity, language and religion is sourced from CIA World Factbook online at https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/theworldfactbook/
Gender Equality Gender Gap Index (GGI), published annually by the World Economic Forum http://www.weforum.org/issues/global-
gender-gap
Group Grievance A tribal society will also experience high levels of group grievance, as defined by the Fund for Peace and used by the
organization as one of the ten measures for the compilation of the Failed States Index. The variable captures the history
of aggrieved communal groups, public scapegoating of those groups with or without nationalistic political rhetoric, any
patterns of atrocity committed with impunity or with support or participation of government groups, and
institutionalized political exclusion
Table documenting sources and construction behind formal and informal institutional controls used.
Appendix B. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusvent.2019.01.007.
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